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1 Introduction
In many important examples in multi-contracting mechanism design, several
principals (attempt to) contract with a common agent to influence her choice.
Such a common agency model has been the focus of much of the recent
research in incentive theory.1
In the common agency model, principals offer a menu of contracts to the
agent, who chooses one contract from the ones being offered. Although one
could imagine more general communication channels between the principals
and the agent, Martimort and Stole (2002), Page and Monteiro (2003), Peters
(2001) and Peters (2003) have shown that such a procedure of offering menus
of contracts is enough to characterize the set of equilibrium allocations. In
fact, as Martimort (2006) points out, “what matters per se is not the kind
of communication that a principal uses with his agent but the set of options
that this principal makes available to the agent.” This result, known as
the delegation principle, implies that the common agency problem can be
analyzed through a menu game.
However, in order for the delegation principle to be meaningful, an equi-
librium must exist. In this paper, we present a solution to this problem by
establishing a general existence theorem for menu games.
In our approach, a menu game is modeled through a game with incom-
plete information. In its extensive form, Nature moves first, choosing the
agent’s type. Following this choice, the first principal chooses a menu of con-
tracts (defined as a closed subset of the contract space) without observing
the agent’s type. Then, the second principal offers his menu of contracts, ob-
1See Martimort (2006) for a survey.
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serving neither the agent’s type nor the menu offered by the first principal.
After all principals have made their offers, the agent chooses one contract (or
one contract of each principal), knowing her type and the menus offered by
the principals.
Since a menu game is a game with incomplete information, we focus on
sequential equilibria. As we allow for a Polish space of types and a com-
pact metric space of contracts, its extensive form will, typically, be infinite.
Despite this technical difficulty, it is easy to define the notion of sequential
equilibrium of a menu game. In fact, each principal has a unique informa-
tion set and all of the agent’s information sets are singletons. Therefore, an
assessment, i.e. a pair of beliefs and strategies, is consistent if beliefs are de-
fined using the strategy and Bayes’ rule. Moreover, a consistent assessment
is sequentially rational if: (1) the agent optimizes at every possible type and
vector of menus and (2) each principal optimizes given the strategy of the
other principals and the strategy of the agent.2
We can rephrase the above description of sequential equilibria in menu
games in the following way. Note that a strategy for the agent induces a
normal-form game between the principals. In fact, this is a game where
each principal has the set of all possible menus as his own pure strategy set
and his payoff is determined by the choice of all principals together with
the agent’s strategy. Thus, a sequential equilibrium consists of the beliefs
described above, an optimal strategy for the agent and a Nash equilibrium
for the normal-form game induced by such strategy.
2Thus, the set of sequential equilibrium strategies coincides with the set of perfect
Bayesian equilibria.
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The above description of a sequential equilibrium is useful because we can
regard the family of normal-form games induced by the agent’s strategies as
a game with an endogenous sharing rule as in Simon and Zame (1990) and,
therefore, use their existence theorem to establish the existence of sequential
equilibria in menu games. In fact, a vector of menus defines a subset of
payoffs for the principals, each of which corresponds to a particular strategy
of the agent. This clearly defines a correspondence from principals’ strategies
into payoffs as required for a game with an endogenous sharing rule.
In order to use Simon and Zame’s theorem in our setting, we need to
generalize it along two dimensions. The first is relatively straightforward and
amounts to allowing the payoff correspondence to depend on the agent’s type.
Using a similar approach as in Simon and Zame (1990), we show that any
such generalized game with endogenous sharing rules has a solution provided
that, on top of their assumptions, the payoff correspondence is measurable.
A second generalization is needed in order to obtain a sequential equilib-
rium from a solution. A solution for a (generalized) game with an endogenous
sharing rule is a strategy for the principals and a measurable selection from
the payoff correspondence such that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the
normal-form game with that selection as its payoff function. Hence, an an-
swer to our problem can be obtained by addressing the following question: is
there a measurable selection from the agent’s optimal choice correspondence
such that, when composed with the principals’ payoff function, equals the
selection from the payoff correspondence which is part of a solution? Our
second generalization addresses this question, showing that when the pay-
off correspondence is the composition of players’ payoff functions with some
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correspondence (interpreted as the optimal choice correspondence of players
whose behavior is not explicitly modeled), then every measurable selection
from the payoff correspondence can be obtained as the composition of play-
ers’ payoff function and a measurable selection of this other correspondence.
Combining our two generalizations, we show that every menu game satisfying
enough continuity properties has a sequential equilibrium.
The existence of equilibrium in menu games has also been addressed by
Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2005). The main differ-
ence between our approach and theirs is that they focus on a normal-form
game played by the principals. In Monteiro and Page (2005), they fixed ex-
ogenously an optimal strategy for the agent, and then proceed to address
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the resulting normal-form game. A
similar approach is used in Page and Monteiro (2003), although there the
payoff function used by the principals is defined differently and cannot, in
general, be induced by an optimal strategy of the agent. Due to those differ-
ences, we were able to find examples of equilibria in their sense there are not
part of any sequential equilibrium, and also, examples of sequential equilib-
rium strategies for the principals that are not equilibria in their sense (see
Carmona and Fajardo (2006)).
Nevertheless, in menu games with exclusivity (i.e., in which the agent
chooses only one principal) and no fixed costs (i.e., a principal receives a
zero payoff if not chosen by the agent), we show in Carmona and Fajardo
(2006) that every equilibrium in the sense of Monteiro and Page (2005) is
part of a sequential equilibrium. Thus, for this class of games, their main
result provides a solution to the existence question that has the advantage of
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allowing for principals’ payoff functions that are only upper semicontinuous
and integrably bounded and not continuous and bounded, as required by our
existence result. In contrast, our existence result can be applied in general
menu games, requiring neither the exclusivity and no-fixed-cost assumptions
nor the particular payoff functions for both the agent and the principals used
by Monteiro and Page (2005).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Then, we present the definition and characterization of sequential equilib-
ria in Section 3. We establish our existence result in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Menu Games
Consider a game with m principals who can offer contracts to a single agent.
The set of contracts that principal i can offer is denoted by Ki and we assume
that Ki is a compact metric space. Each principal offers a menu of contracts
to the agent. A menu of contracts for principal i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m} is just a
nonempty closed subset Ci of Ki.
In Martimort and Stole (2002) for example, the set of contracts that a
principal can offer equals the set of probability measures over the allocations
controlled by him. Under the assumption that the set of these allocations is
finite, it follows that each principal’s contract space is compact. They allow
each principal i to offer a mechanism to the agent, consisting of a message
space Mi and an outcome function gi :Mi → Ki. If Mi is compact and gi
is continuous, then the menu gi(Mi) induced by (Mi, gi) is a closed subset
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of Ki. Thus, in this setting, assuming that menus are closed subsets of Ki
amounts to assuming that principals use mechanisms with compact message
spaces and continuous outcome functions.
Let Pi be the collection of all nonempty, closed subsets of Ki. It is well
known that Pi is a compact metric space when endowed with the Hausdorff
metric. Let P = P1 × · · · × Pm and C = (C1, . . . , Cm) denote a profile of
menus.
Let K denote the pure action space of the agent. We assume that K is
a compact metric space and we let k denote a generic element of K. There
are two particular cases for K in which we are interested. One, considered
in Page and Monteiro (2003), is KPM = {(i, f) ∈ I × ∪mi=1Ki : f ∈ Ki},
where I = {1, . . . ,m}. Here, the agent chooses the principal with whom she
wishes to contract and chooses one contract from this principal. Implicitly,
the assumption is that contracts are exclusive.
A second particular case, considered in Martimort and Stole (2002), is
KMS = K1 × · · · ×Km. In this case, contracts are not exclusive and so the
agent can choose a contract from each principal.
These two cases can be combined in a hybrid model in which a subset
Ie ⊆ I of principals only allows for exclusive contracts. In this case, let
KH = {(i, f) ∈ Ie × ∪i∈IeKi : f ∈ Ki} ×
∏
i∈Ice Ki.
3 It is clear that KPM ,
KMS and KH are compact.
The agent’s payoff depends on her type, which is described by an element
of a Polish space T (i.e., T is a complete separable metric space). We endow
3In all the above models, we can let some f ∈ Ki denote no contracting, following Page
and Monteiro (2003).
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T with its Borel σ – algebra and let µ describe the probability measure on
the set of types.4 The agent’s utility function is v : T × K → R and we
assume that v is a Carathe´odory function.5
The agent’s problem is as follows. Knowing t ∈ T and given a menu
profile C offered by the principals, she can choose a mixed strategy over
K. A mixed strategy is a Borel probability measure on K and we let ∆(K)
denote the space of all such probability measures. The set of available mixed
strategies is described by a nonempty compact convex set ϕ(t, C) ⊆ ∆(K).
Furthermore, we assume that the correspondence ϕ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) is
continuous.
The idea behind the constraint correspondence ϕ is that the agent can
choose only among the contracts being offered, i.e., she can only choose a
contract fi ∈ Ci from principal i. Therefore, we have three possible specifi-
cations for ϕ corresponding to the above particular cases for K:
ϕPM(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(KPM) : λ(∪mi=1({i} × Ci)) = 1}
in the exclusivity case,
ϕMS(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(KMS) : λ(C) = 1}
in the non-exclusivity case and
ϕH(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(KH) : λ(∪i∈Ie({i} × Ci)×
∏
i∈Ice
Ci) = 1}
4Throughout the paper, we endow all metric spaces we consider with their Borel σ –
algebra. Therefore, we abbreviate Borel-measurable by measurable.
5If (S,Σ) is a measurable space, X and Y are topological spaces and f : S ×X → Y is
a function, then f is a Carathe´odory function if it is measurable in s and continuous in x.
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in the hybrid case. Lemma 7 in Appendix shows that ϕPM , ϕMP and ϕH are
continuous with nonempty, convex and compact values.
Hence, given t ∈ T and C ∈ P , the agent’s problem is
max
λ∈ϕ(t,C)
∫
K
v(t, k)dλ(k).
Let Λ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) denote the correspondence of optimal choices. A
strategy for the agent is then a measurable function σ : T ×P → ∆(K), and,
clearly, σ is an optimal strategy if and only if it is a selection of Λ.
We now turn to the principals’ problem. Principals choose simultaneously.
For all i ∈ I, principal i’s choice set is ∆(Pi), the set of mixed strategies on
Pi and his profit function is denoted by pii : T ×K→ R. We assume that pii
is a bounded Carathe´odory function.6
If the principals offer a menu C = (C1, . . . , Cm) ∈ P and the agent uses
a strategy σ : T × P → ∆(K), then principal i’s payoff is
Fi(t, C; σ) =
∫
K
pii(t, k)dσ(k|t, C).
Since σ is measurable, then so is the real-valued function Fi on T×P . Finally,
if principals choose strategies α = (α1, . . . , αm) and the agent chooses a
strategy σ,
Fi(α;σ) =
∫
P
∫
T
Fi(t, C;σ)dµ(t)dα(C) (1)
denotes principal i’s payoff.
A menu game is denoted by G and we use GPM , GMS and GH to denote
particular menu games for the corresponding choices of K and ϕ mentioned
6Note that we are strengthening the assumptions made by Page and Monteiro (2003)
since they have only assumed that t 7→ pii(t, k) is measurable, k 7→ pii(t, k) is upper
semicontinuous and that pii is µ – integrably bounded.
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above. We say that a menu game G is continuous if it satisfies all the above
assumptions.
3 Sequential Equilibrium
We can think of a menu game as being played in the following way. First,
nature chooses a type for the agent and then, without knowing this, principals
simultaneously choose a menu. Finally, the agent knowing her type and the
menu choices of every principal, chooses an element of K.
We can use an extensive form to describe a menu game G. Each initial
note corresponds to a choice of a type for the agent by nature, and so, we
index those nodes by t ∈ T . Principal 1 is the first to choose. Since he does
not observe the type of the agent, principal 1’s information set H1 consists of
the set of initial nodes; thus, slightly abusing notation, we write H1 = T . At
H1, principal 1 chooses a menu C1 ∈ P1, which is not observed by principal
2. Therefore, principal 2’s information set H2 is equal to {(t, C1) : t ∈
T and C1 ∈ P1} = T×P1. Proceeding in this way, letHi = T×P1×· · ·×Pi−1.
Finally, the agent observes her type and the choice of each principal and so
the family of her (singleton) information sets is {(t, C) : t ∈ T and C ∈ P}.
She chooses an element k ∈ K and a terminal node is reached. Payoffs are
then determined using the agent’s and principals’ payoff functions.
Since we represent a menu game by a game with incomplete information,
it is natural to use sequential equilibrium as the solution concept (see Kreps
and Wilson (1982)). Recall that an assessment is a pair of beliefs ν and
strategies (α, σ) and that a sequential equilibrium is a consistent sequen-
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tially rational assessment. Since there are (possibly) an infinite number of
information sets, we must explicitly require that strategies — functions from
information sets into actions — be measurable.
Consistent assessments (ν, (α, σ)) are easy to characterize in a menu game.
First, since each of the agent’s information sets is a singleton, her belief there
must assign probability one to that single point. Second, if νi denotes the
belief in principal i’s information set Hi, and B is a measurable subset of Hi,
then νi(B) = µ× α1 × · · · × αi−1(B). This follows because if the probability
distribution induced by (α, σ) on the nodes of the extensive form is denoted
by Pα,σ, then Pα,σ(Hi) = 1 and so
νi(B) = P
α,σ(B|Hi) = Pα,σ(B) = µ× α1 × · · · × αi−1(B). (2)
Using these beliefs, sequential equilibria of menu games are characterized
in the following remark.
Remark 1 An assessment (ν, (α, σ)) is a sequential equilibrium of a menu
game G if and only if
1. νi = µ× α1 × · · · × αi−1 for all i ∈ I,
2. σ is a measurable selection of Λ and
3. Fi(α;σ) ≥ Fi(α¯i, α−i;σ) for all i ∈ I and α¯i ∈ ∆(Pi).
Thus, in a sequential equilibrium of G, beliefs are determined by Bayes’
rule, the agent optimizes for all possible types and menus offered, and each
principal optimizes given the strategy of the other principals and the strategy
of the agent.
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4 Existence of Sequential Equilibrium
Our main result is the following existence theorem.
Theorem 1 A sequential equilibrium exists for all continuous games G.
Since the frameworks of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Martimort and
Stole (2002) are particular cases of ours, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 All continuous games GH , GPM and GMS have a sequential
equilibrium.
In order to establish Theorem 1 we first generalize the theorem in Simon
and Zame (1990) by allowing the payoff correspondence to depend on the
agent’s type. We then use this result to prove the existence of a sequential
equilibrium in any continuous menu game. This last argument uses Lemma
2, below, which shows how to obtain a sequential equilibrium from a solution
of a (generalized) game with an endogenous sharing rule.
4.1 A Generalization of Simon and Zame’s Theorem
A generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule isG = (P1, . . . , Pm, T,Q)
satisfying Pi is a compact metric space for all i, T is a Polish space and
Q : T × P ⇒ Rm is measurable, bounded, has nonempty, convex and com-
pact values and is upper hemi-continuous in C for all t ∈ T (i.e., C 7→ Q(t, C)
is upper hemi-continuous for all t ∈ T ).
A solution for G is a pair (q, α) such that q is a measurable selection of
Q, αi ∈ ∆(Pi) and∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)dα(C) ≥
∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C)
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for all i and all βi ∈ ∆(Pi).
Theorem 2 A solution exists for all generalized games with an endogenous
sharing rule.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows closely the one in Simon and Zame (1990)
and is presented in Appendix A.1.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows: first, we define a generalized
game with an endogenous sharing rule, essentially, defining the payoff corre-
spondence by composing principals’ payoff functions with the optimal choice
correspondence of the agent. We then use Theorem 2 to obtain a solution to
that generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule. Then, we use Lemma
2 to show that the measurable selection from the payoff correspondence can
be written as the composition between the principals’ payoff function and a
measurable selection from the agent’s optimal choice correspondence (i.e., an
optimal strategy for the agent). Finally, we show that this strategy together
with the principals’ strategies that are part of the solution for the generalized
game with an endogenous sharing rule form a sequential equilibrium strategy.
Let h : T × P ×∆(K)→ Rm be defined by
h(t, C, λ) =
∫
K
pi(t, k)dλ(k). (3)
Note that if σ : T ×P → ∆(K) is a strategy for the agent, then F (t, C; σ) =
h(t, C, σ(t, C)) for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Also, note that h is independent of
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C, λ 7→ h(t, C, λ) is continuous and (t, C) 7→ h(t, C, λ) is measurable. Hence,
h is a Carathe´odory function. Define Q : T × P ⇒ Rm by
Q(t, C) = {h(t, C, λ) : λ ∈ Λ(t, C)}. (4)
Lemma 1 The correspondence Λ is measurable and has compact values. The
correspondence Q is measurable, bounded, upper hemi-continuous in C for all
t ∈ T and has nonempty, convex and compact values.
It follows by Lemma 1 that G = (P1, . . . , Pm, T,Q) is a generalized game
with an endogenous sharing rule. Hence, by Theorem 2, there exists a solu-
tion (q, α) for G.
In order to obtain a sequential equilibrium from the solution (q, α), we
use the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let S be a measurable space, X be a compact metric space, g :
S × X → Rm a Carathe´odory function and Θ : S ⇒ X a compact valued,
measurable correspondence.
If Q : S ⇒ Rm is defined by
Q(s) = {g(s, x) : x ∈ Θ(s)}
for all s ∈ S and q is a measurable selection of Q, then there exists a mea-
surable selection α of Θ such that q(s) = g(α(s)) for all s ∈ S.
Since T × P is a measurable space, ∆(K) is a compact metric space
and Λ is compact valued and measurable, then by Lemma 2, there exists
a measurable selection σ from Λ such that q(t, C) = h(t, C, σ(t, C)) for all
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t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Hence,
Fi(α; σ) =
∫
P
∫
T
hi(t, C, σ(t, C))dµ(t)dα(C) =∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)dα(C) ≥
∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C) =∫
P
∫
T
hi(t, C, σ(t, C))dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C) = Fi(βi, α−i;σ)
(5)
for all i and all βi ∈ ∆(Pi). It then follows that, if ν is as in Remark 1, then
(ν, (α, σ)) is a sequential equilibrium of G.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that a sequential equilibrium exists in all continuous menu
games. Compared with the results of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro
and Page (2005), our existence theorem has the advantage of dispensing with
the exclusivity and the no-fixed-cost assumptions made in those papers.
Our approach also has the advantage of being simpler than the one used
by Monteiro and Page (2005). In fact, they choose an optimal strategy
for the agent and then proceed by studying the challenging problem of the
existence of a Nash equilibrium for the resulting normal-form game played by
the principals. In contrast, we proceed by determining the agent’s strategy
endogenously, which, as Simon and Zame (1990) have pointed out, simplifies
the existence problem considerably.
Our approach relies heavily on the ideas of Simon and Zame (1990). In
fact, the proof of our existence result is straightforward once we extend their
theorem, first, to the case in which the principals’ payoff correspondence
depends on the agent’s type and, second, to the case where it equals the
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composition of the agent’s optimal choice correspondence and principals’
payoff functions. This second result allows us to obtain an equilibrium in the
usual sense from a solution in the sense of Simon and Zame (1990).
We hope that these two results prove to be useful in analyzing similar
problems, for instance, the principal-agent relationship with an informed
principal of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and its generalization to a common
agency problem considered in Martimort and Moreira (2006).
A Appendix
In the appendix, we prove Theorem 2, and Lemmas 1 and 2. Also, we prove
that the correspondences ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH are continuous with nonempty,
convex, compact values.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Our proof of Theorem 2 follows the one in Simon and Zame (1990). Indeed,
we start by modifying their Lemma 2 and then proceed by adapting the six
steps of their proof to our setting.
Both their Lemma 2 and our version of it applies to vector-valued mea-
sures defined as follows. If S is a Polish space, q is a bounded, measur-
able function from S into Rm and ψ is a probability measure on S, define
qψ ∈ ∆(S) by
qψ(B) =
∫
B
qdψ (6)
for all measurable subsets B of S. The following two lemmas consider the
special case where S = T × P and ψ = µ × α for some α ∈ ∆(P ). They
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establish some properties of q(µ× α) that are useful in our version of Simon
and Zame’s Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If α ∈ ∆(P ) and q : T × P → Rm is bounded and measurable,
then
q(µ× α) = µ× qα.
Proof. Let A and B be measurable subsets of T and P , respectively.
Then,
q(µ× α)(A×B) =
∫
A
(∫
B
qdα
)
dµ
=
∫
A
qα(B)dµ
= µ(A)qα(B).
Hence, the result follows from Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 24, p. 47).
Let q : T × P → Rm be bounded and measurable and define qˆ : P → Rm
by
qˆ(C) =
∫
T
q(t, C)dµ(t). (7)
If X and Y are metric spaces and ν is a measure on X × Y , νY denotes the
marginal distribution of ν on Y .
Lemma 4 If q : T ×P → Rm is bounded and measurable, then qˆ is measur-
able and
qˆα = q(µ× α)P .
Proof. Since q is bounded and measurable, the integral exists. The
measurability of qˆ follows from Fubini’s Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Theorem 11.26, p. 411)).
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We turn to the second claim. Let B be a measurable subset of P . It
follows that
qˆα(B) =
∫
B
qˆdα =
∫
B
∫
T
qdµdα =∫
T×B
qd(µ× α) = q(µ× α)(T ×B) = q(µ× α)P (B).
Thus, the lemma follows.
After these preliminaries, we turn to our version of Lemma 2 in Simon
and Zame (1990). There, we allow for the case where S is the product of a
Polish space (i.e., a complete separable metric space) and a compact metric
space and Q is measurable but only upper hemi-continuous in the second
variable. However, we assume that all the measures involved are finite.
Lemma 5 Let {νn} be a sequence of probability measures on P converging
weakly to ν and let Q : T × P ⇒ Rm be a bounded, measurable correspon-
dence, upper hemi-continuous in C for all t ∈ T and with compact, convex,
nonempty values. For each n, let qn be a measurable selection from Q.
If the sequence {qn(µ × νn)} of vector-valued measures converges weakly
to a vector-valued measure ξ, then there exists a measurable selection q from
Q such that ξ = q(µ× ν).
Proof. Note that {µ× νn} converges weakly to {µ× ν} by Hildenbrand
(1974, Theorem 27, pg. 49). Therefore, the boundedness of Q implies, as in
Simon and Zame (1990, Lemma 2), that there exists a measurable function
q : T × P → Rm such that ξ = q(µ× ν).
Let H = {(t, C) ∈ T × P : q(t, C) 6∈ Q(t, C)}. Since both q and Q are
measurable, then H is measurable. In fact, let S = T × P for convenience,
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f = (idS, q) and δ : S × Rm → R be defined by δ(s, x) = maxz∈Q(s) ||x− z||.
Clearly, f is measurable since q is also measurable. Since Q is measurable,
then Q is weakly measurable by Theorem 17.2 in Aliprantis and Border
(1999, p. 559). Then, δ is a Carathe´odory function by Theorem 17.5 in
Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 562) and thus measurable since Rm is sep-
arable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.50, p.151)). It follows
that the function g : S → R defined by g = δ ◦ f is measurable and that
H = {s ∈ S : g(s) > 0} is a measurable subset of S.
Let t ∈ T and Ht = {C ∈ P : (t, C) ∈ H}. Since H is a measurable
subset of T × P , then Ht is a measurable subset of P (see Aliprantis and
Border (1999, Lemma 4.45, p. 148)). Since P is compact and c 7→ Q(t, c) is
upper hemi-continuous, it follows by the arguments of Simon and Zame that
ν(Ht) = 0. Thus,
µ× ν(H) =
∫
T
ν(Ht)dµ(t) = 0
by Fubini’s Theorem. This completes the proof since we can correct q in H,
obtaining a function that is still measurable.
We turn to the proof of Theorem 2, showing that the same arguments
used by Simon and Zame extend to our setting, with minor changes.
Step 1: Finite approximations. Recall that P is a compact metric
space. As in Simon and Zame (1990), discretize P in order to obtain, for
all r ∈ N, a finite action space P ri for all players i = 1, . . . ,m, a measurable
selection qr from Q and a solution (αr1, . . . , α
r
m) for G
r = (P r1 , . . . , P
r
m, T,Q).
Let αr = αr1 × · · · × αrm.
Step 2: Limits. Since ∆(Pi) is compact, then we may assume that {αri}
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converges for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, {αr} converges. Letting α = limr αr, it
follows that {µ× αr} converges to µ× α.
Similarly, we may assume that {qrαr} converges. This, together with
Lemma 3, implies that {qr(µ × αr)} = {µ × qrαr} converges. Let ξ =
limr q
r(µ× αr).
Step 3: Selections. By Lemma 5, there exists a measurable selection
q from Q such that ξ = q(µ× α).
Step 4: Better responses. Recall that gˆ : P → Rm is defined by
gˆ(C) =
∫
T
g(t, C)dµ(t) for all bounded and measurable functions g : T×P →
Rm.
By Lemma 4, qˆ is measurable and αr is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-
form game (P r1 , . . . , P
r
m, qˆ) for all r ∈ N. Since qˆα = q(µ×α)P and, similarly,
qˆrαr = qr(µ× αr)P , it follows that {qˆrαr} converges to qˆα.
If X is a metric space and x ∈ X, let δx denote the probability measure
on X degenerate on x. Letting
Hi =
{
Ci ∈ Pi :
∫
P
∫
T
qidµd(δCi × α−i) >
∫
P
∫
T
qidµd(αi × α−i)
}
, (8)
it follows from Simon and Zame (1990, Step 4) that
αi(Hi) = αi
({
xi ∈ Pi :
∫
P
qˆid(δCi × α−i) >
∫
P
qˆid(αi × α−i)
})
= 0.
Step 5: Perturbation. As in Step 5 of Simon and Zame (1990), for all
i, let pi : T × P → Rm be any measurable selection from Q which minimizes
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the ith component. Let Y = {C ∈ P : Ci ∈ Hi for at least two indices i}
and define f : T × P → Rm as follows:
f(t, C) =
 pi(t, C) if C ∈ Hi × P−i but C 6∈ Y,q(t, C) otherwise. (9)
Since α(Hi × P−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I, then∫
P
∫
T
fdµdα =
∫
P\∪mi=1(Hi×P−i)
∫
T
qdµdα =
∫
P
∫
T
qdµdα.
Therefore, ∫
P
fˆdα =
∫
P
qˆdα. (10)
Let i ∈ I. If xi 6∈ Hi, then
qˆi(C) = fˆi(C) (11)
except possibly for C ∈ [{Ci} × P−i] ∩ [∪j 6=i(Hj × P−j)]. Finally, we also
have that
pˆii(C) = fˆi(C) (12)
for all C ∈ Hi × P−i and C 6∈ Y .
Step 6: Solution. Note that pii : T × P → R is lower semi-continuous
in C for all t ∈ T , as in Simon and Zame (1990, step 6). Thus, it follows from
Fatou’s Lemma (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.19, p. 407))
that pˆii : P → R is lower semi-continuous. Because of equations (10), (11)
and (12), it follows from Simon and Zame (1990, Step 6) that α is a Nash
equilibrium of the normal-form game (P1, . . . , Pm, fˆ). Since fˆ =
∫
T
fdµ, it
follows that (f, α) is a solution of G = (P1, . . . , Pm, T,Q).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For convenience, let S = T ×P . Note first that Λ is measurable by Theorem
17.18 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 570) and has nonempty, convex and
compact values. Furthermore, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see Berge
(1997, p. 116)), the correspondence C 7→ Λ(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous
for all t ∈ T .
Then, Q is bounded since pi is bounded and Q is nonempty valued since
Λ is also nonempty valued. Since for all s ∈ S, Λ(s) is compact, Q(s) =
h(s,Λ(s)) and λ 7→ h(s, λ) is continuous, then Q(s) is compact. Thus, Q is
compact valued.
Since Λ is convex valued, then Q is convex valued as well. Indeed, if
s ∈ S, x1, x2 ∈ Q(s) and a ∈ (0, 1), then there exists λl ∈ Λ(s) such that
xl = h(s, λl) for all l = 1, 2. Then, aλ1+(1−a)λ2 ∈ Λ(s) and ax1+(1−a)x2 =
h(s, aλ1 + (1− a)λ2) imply that ax1 + (1− a)x2 ∈ Q(s).
Since C 7→ Λ(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous and C 7→ h(t, C) is contin-
uous for all t ∈ T , then C 7→ Q(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous.
Finally, we show that Q is measurable. Note first that h is measurable by
Lemma 4.50 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 151) since ∆(K) is a compact
metric space. Define Ξ : S ⇒ S ×∆(K) by Ξ(s) = {(s, λ) : λ ∈ Λ(s)}.
We claim that Ξ is measurable. Since Ξ is compact valued, then it is
enough to show that Ξ is weakly measurable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999,
Lemma 17.2, p. 559)). Let A and B be measurable subsets of S and ∆(K),
respectively. Then, Ξ`(A×B) = {s ∈ S : Ξ(s) ∩ (A×B) 6= ∅} = A ∩ Λ`(B)
is measurable since Λ is measurable. Therefore, if V = ∪∞k=1(Ak × Bk) and
Ak and Bk are measurable subsets of S and ∆(K), respectively, for all k ∈ N,
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then Ξ`(V ) = ∪∞k=1Ξ`(Ak × Bk) is measurable. Therefore, if V is an open
subset of S×∆(K), then there exist sequences {Ak} and {Bk} of open subsets
of S and ∆(K) such that V = ∪∞k=1(Ak × Bk) since both S and ∆(K) are
second countable. Thus, Ξ`(V ) is measurable and so Ξ is weakly measurable.
Since Ξ is measurable, then Q is measurable as well. In fact, let B be a
measurable subset of Rm. Then, h−1(B) is a measurable subset of S×∆(K)
and so Q`(B) = {s ∈ S : Ξ(s) ∩ h−1(B) 6= ∅} = Ξ`(h−1(B)) is measurable.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to prove Lemma 2, we need the following result.
Lemma 6 Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, X be a compact metric space
and f : S ×X → Rm be a Carathe´odory function. Then, the correspondence
ζ : S ⇒ X defined by
ζ(s) = {x ∈ X : f(s, x) = 0}
is measurable.
Proof. The lemma corresponds to Aliprantis and Border (1999, Corollary
17.8, p. 563) when m = 1. To extend it to an arbitrary m ∈ N, simply
substitute the absolute value (in R) used in the proof of that corollary by a
norm in Rm.
We next turn to the proof of Lemma 2. Consider H : S ⇒ X defined by
H(s) = {x ∈ X : g(s, x) = q(s)}. (13)
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If there exists a measurable selection σ from H ∩ Θ, then q(s) = g(s, σ(s))
for all s ∈ S. So, it is enough to show that H ∩Θ has a measurable selection.
Note that H ∩ Θ is nonempty valued. This is so because q(s) ∈ Q(s) =
{g(s, x) : x ∈ Θ(s)}. Since x 7→ g(s, x) is continuous for all s ∈ S, then H(s)
is a closed subset of X, hence compact. Thus, H is compact valued, and so
is H ∩Θ.
Let f : S ×X → Rm be defined by
f(s, x) = g(s, x)− q(s). (14)
Then, f is measurable in s and continuous in x. Note that H(s) = {x ∈
X : f(s, x) = 0} for all s ∈ S. Since S is a measurable space (with its
Borel σ – algebra) and X is a compact metric space, it follows by Lemma 6
that H is measurable. Then, H ∩Θ is measurable by Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Lemma 17.4.3, p. 560). Then, H∩Θ is weakly measurable (Aliprantis
and Border (1999, Lemma 17.2.1, p. 559)) and so by the Kuratowski-Ryll-
Nardzewski Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 17.13, p.
567)) H ∩Θ has a measurable selection.
A.4 Properties of ϕ
In this appendix, we establish the properties of the agent’s constraint corre-
spondences ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH . In all these cases, the result is a consequence
of the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 If φ : P ⇒ K is continuous with nonempty compact values, then
ϕ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) defined by
ϕ(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(K) : λ(φ(C)) = 1}
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is continuous and has nonempty, convex, compact values.
Proof. It follows from Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.14,
p. 530) that ϕ is upper hemi-continuous with nonempty, compact, convex
values.
We claim that ϕ is also lower hemi-continuous. In order to prove this
claim, let {tn}∞n=1 be a convergent sequence in T , {Cn}∞n=1 be a convergent
sequence in P , t = limn tn, C = limnCn and λ ∈ ϕ(t, C). We need to
prove that there exists a subsequence {nj}∞j=1 of indexes and elements λnj ∈
ϕ(tnj , Cnj) such that λnj converges to λ.
By Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.16, p. 531), the function Φ
from P into the space of all nonempty, compact subsets of K endowed with
the Hausdorff metric defined by Φ(C) = φ(C) is continuous. Thus, letting
dH denote the Hausdorff metric, it follows that dH(φ(Cn), φ(C)) converges
to zero.
For all j ∈ N, let nj ∈ N be such that dH(φ(Cnj), φ(C)) < 1/j. Let j be
fixed. Since dH(φ(Cnj), φ(C)) < 1/j, then φ(C) ⊆ ∪k∈φ(Cnj )B1/j(k). Since
φ(C) is a compact subset of K, then there exists {k1, . . . , kM} ⊆ φ(Cnj) such
that φ(C) ⊆ ∪Mm=1B1/j(km).
Finally, define B1 = B1/j(k1), Bm = B1/j(km) \ ∪m−1l=1 Bl for all m =
2, . . . ,M , and λnj by setting λnj(km) = λ(Bm) for all m = 1, . . . ,M .
Since λ(φ(C)) = 1, then λnj(φ(Cnj)) = 1 and, arguing as in the proof
of Parthasarathy (1967, Theorem II.6.3), it follows that λnj converges to λ.
Therefore, ϕ is lower hemi-continuous.
As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 2 The correspondences ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH are continuous with
nonempty, convex, compact values.
Proof. In the case of ϕMS, simply define φMS : P ⇒ KMS by φMS(C) =
C. Clearly, φMS is continuous and has nonempty compact values.
In the case ϕPM , we define for all i ∈ I, φi : P ⇒ KPM by φi(C) = {i}×Ci
and φPM : P ⇒ KPM by φPM(C) = ∪mi=1φi(C). Clearly, φPM has nonempty
and compact values and φi is continuous for all i ∈ I. Since the finite union of
continuous correspondences is continuous (see Aliprantis and Border (1999,
Theorem 16.27, p. 537)), then φPM is continuous.
In the hybrid case, we define for j = 1, 2, φj : P ⇒ KH , by φ1(C) =
∪i∈Ie{i} × Ci and φ2(C) =
∏
i∈Ice Ci. These correspondences are continuous
and have nonempty and compact values. Finally, define φH : P ⇒ KH by
φH(C) = φ1(C) × φ2(C). Since the finite product of continuous correspon-
dences with compact values is continuous (see Aliprantis and Border (1999,
Theorem 16.28, p. 537)), then φH is continuous and has nonempty and
compact values as well.
In all cases the conclusion follows from Lemma 7.
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